Oversight of Audit Quality in Australia–A Review

November 2023

© Commonwealth of Australia 2023

This publication is available for your use under a [Creative Commons BY Attribution 3.0 Australia](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/au/deed.en) licence, with the exception of the Commonwealth Coat of Arms and the Financial Reporting Council logo. The full licence terms are available from <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/au/legalcode>

P7#yIS1

Use of Financial Reporting Council material under a [Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Australia](http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/au/deed.en) licence requires you to attribute the work (but not in any way that the Financial Reporting Council suggests that endorses you or your use of the work).

**Financial Reporting Council material used ‘as supplied’.**

Provided you have not modified or transformed Financial Reporting Council material in any way including, for example, by changing the Financial Reporting Council text; calculating percentage changes; graphing or charting data; or deriving new statistics from published Financial Reporting Council statistics – then Financial Reporting Council prefers the following attribution:

*Source: The Financial Reporting Council*

**Derivative** **material**

If you have modified or transformed Financial Reporting Council material, or derived new material from those of the Financial Reporting Council in any way, then Financial Reporting Council prefers the following attribution:

*Based on Financial Reporting Council data*.

**Use of the Coat of Arms**

The terms under which the Coat of Arms can be used are set out on the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet website (see [https://www.pmc.gov.au/honours‑and‑symbols/commonwealth‑coat‑arms](https://www.pmc.gov.au/honours-and-symbols/commonwealth-coat-arms)).

**Other uses**

Enquiries regarding this licence and any other use of this document are welcome at:

Secretariat  
Financial Reporting Council  
c/‑ The Treasury  
Langton Crescent  
Parkes ACT 2600

Email: [secretariat@frc.gov.au](mailto:secretariat@frc.gov.au)

*In the spirit of reconciliation, Financial Reporting Council acknowledges the Traditional Custodians of country throughout Australia and their connections to land, sea and community. We pay our respect to their Elders past and present and extend that respect to all Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples.*

# Contents

[Executive Summary 1](#_Toc149551263)

[Scope and Methodology 3](#_Toc149551264)

[Findings 4](#_Toc149551265)

[Recommendations 6](#_Toc149551266)

[Overview of Framework 10](#_Toc149551268)

[Education and Registration Of Accountants and Auditors 11](#_Toc149551269)

[The Audit Firms 13](#_Toc149551270)

[Professional Accounting Bodies Oversight of Auditors 16](#_Toc149551276)

[ASIC’s Oversight of Auditors 20](#_Toc149551284)

[The CADB 26](#_Toc149551294)

[The APESB 28](#_Toc149551295)

[The AASB and AUASB 29](#_Toc149551296)

[Directors and Audit Committees 30](#_Toc149551297)

[Appendix 1 – Comparison of ASIC, PCAOB, UK FRC, NZ FMA and CPAB 32](#_Toc149551298)

[Appendix 2 – How the Recommendations from the 2019 Disciplinary Review have been Addressed 37](#_Toc149551299)

[Appendix 3 – Stakeholders Interviewed 43](#_Toc149551300)

[Glossary 44](#_Toc149551301)

[Resources Reviewed 46](#_Toc149551302)

|  |
| --- |
| About the FRC  The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) is responsible for overseeing the effectiveness of the financial reporting framework in Australia. Its key functions include the oversight of the accounting and auditing standards setting processes for the public and private sectors, providing strategic advice in relation to the quality of audits conducted by Australian auditors, and advising the Minister on these and related matters to the extent that they affect the financial reporting framework in Australia.  The FRC monitors the development of international accounting and auditing standards, works to further the development of a single set of accounting and auditing standards for world‑wide use and promotes the adoption of these standards. It is a statutory body under Part 12 of the [*Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001*](http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2012C00694/Html/Text#_Toc336955476) (the ASIC Act).  Refer to the [FRC’s website](https://frc.gov.au/about-frc/frc-members) for details of the members and the Declarations of Interest which are included in the public meeting papers. |

# Executive Summary

Confidence in the quality of auditing is paramount to the effectiveness of the financial reporting framework in Australia and fostering confidence in the integrity of our markets. The FRC is the peak body responsible for overseeing the effectiveness of the financial reporting framework in Australia, including providing strategic policy advice and reports to the Minister and the PABs0F[[1]](#footnote-1)  in relation to the quality of audits conducted by Australian auditors.1F[[2]](#footnote-2)

In 2019 the FRC conducted an assessment of the adequacy of auditor disciplinary functions in Australia and produced a report [Auditor Disciplinary Processes](https://treasury.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-04/p2019-t374191-review.pdf). This report included some recommendations for ASIC, the CADB, CA ANZ, CPAA, and the IPA.The FRC have continued to monitor the results of the disciplinary processes of the different bodies, and their responses to the recommendations.

The FRC has been monitoring developments in relation to audit quality and noted there was a lack of visibility and granular data on auditor disciplinary tools, actions and outcomes from PABs, audit firms and regulators. To address this the FRC have conducted a review to assess gaps in how audit quality system is supported and monitored in Australia. The FRC have considered if improvements are necessary to address any gaps or overlaps in processes, and how they could be better co‑ordinated between stakeholders.

The Government announced on 6 August 2023 that Treasury would be examining the regulation of consulting, accounting and auditing firms, including issues such as governance, transparency, executive responsibility, management of conflicts of interest and dealing with misconduct. The FRC’s recommendations may assist deliberations of that review.

In summary, the FRC considers that auditors are subject to a robust set of professional standards designed to support the performance of high audit quality audits. However, the FRC considers that the system could benefit from more independent oversight to ensure all auditors are complying with the required standards. The recommendations relate to:

* All auditors should be subject to regulatory oversight on a timely basis.
* ASIC’s program should review more audit files on an annual basis.
* ASIC should publish an audit surveillance strategic plan with stated objectives and key performance indicators, and have ongoingcommunication with the PABs as to the scope of the program.
* The PABs should consider the objectives of their quality review programs and co‑ordination with ASIC.
* The PABs should report more comprehensively on the scope and results of their quality review programs.
* Relevant ethical standards should be given force of law and be subject to a compliance review by a regulator.
* There should be consideration as to whether the PABs’ investigatory and disciplinary processes are combined and performed by a single independent body.

Refer to our findings and recommendations for more details.

The FRC thanks all stakeholders who generously shared their time and assisted us in performing this review.

# Scope and Methodology

The review considered how audit quality and compliance with auditing and ethical standards by auditors is supported and monitored, including processes to identify breaches and escalation to disciplinary action. The FRC’s mandate includes a focus on audit quality and also includes processes used by auditors to comply with applicable codes of professional conduct.2F[[3]](#footnote-3) Therefore, the FRC has included compliance with ethical standards which supports overall firm culture and directly or indirectly audit quality within the scope of this review.

This review involved obtaining an update on the status of the recommendations from the 2019 disciplinary review, and an understanding of:

* existing audit and ethical education, and accreditation requirements, for auditors; and
* the firms’,3F[[4]](#footnote-4) PABs’ and regulatory quality review processes to understand each stakeholder’s responsibilities in relation to supporting and monitoring audit quality.

For completeness the FRC also considered the roles of the standard setters, CADB and Audit Committees in promoting and supporting audit quality. This review did not include the surveillance programs of SMSFs conducted by the ATO.

During the course of the review, it was noted that CA ANZ recently completed its [PCFR](https://www.charteredaccountantsanz.com/news-and-analysis/media-centre/press-releases/ca-anz-professional-conduct-framework-review) which focused on the disciplinary process once an issue is raised. This is useful in the context of the FRC review.

The FRC has also monitored the Federal Parliamentary and other inquiries4F[[5]](#footnote-5) underway in response to recent controversies over the behaviour of certain individuals at some large audit firms, and potential breaches of the ethical standards. Whilst the inquiries are about the broader accounting profession and not specifically audit quality, they have highlighted potential issues associated with regulatory and firm responses to breaches of the ethical standards, transparency, accountability and the governance of the firms, which may be detrimental to audit quality if not addressed. In this report, the FRC makes some observations in these areas.

In performing this review, the FRC conducted targeted interviews with representatives from the 6 largest audit firms, the PABs and ASIC, as well as looking at publicly available statistical and qualitative information about their processes and the findings from their quality reviews. The FRC also met with a broader range of regulators and stakeholders as detailed in Appendix 3. The FRC has relied on the accuracy of the information and feedback provided to us by stakeholders.

The FRC also reviewed relevant legislation and publicly available information about how audit quality is supported and monitored in Australia, as well as the systems in place in some overseas jurisdictions.

# Findings

The FRC’s main findings are:

* ASIC is the statutory regulator who has the power to perform audit surveillance, however there is no legislative requirement for ASIC to undertake proactive surveillance of auditors. As a result, ASIC design their program based on their overall strategy, competing priorities and budgetary pressures.
* There has been a decrease in ASIC’s inspection of audit files in the past few years. During 2022 ASIC introduced a new integrated approach to conducting financial reporting and audit surveillances. ASIC continue to select audit files for review when there is an identified or suspected error in the financial report, and the number of audit files selected for review where there is no identified or suspected material misstatement of the financial report has been significantly reduced. This has resulted in a decrease in the number of audit files reviewed from 455F[[6]](#footnote-6) in 2021/22 to 156F[[7]](#footnote-7) in 2022/23. Whilst the FRC support the continued focus on high quality financial reporting, the FRC consider that there should be a greater number of auditors and audit files reviewed on an annual basis.
* ASIC have indicated that staff resources dedicated to audit surveillance have been reduced in recent years, and the FRC notes that ASIC have less staff dedicated to this role than some overseas jurisdictions. As a result, compared to equivalent bodies, ASIC’s program is relatively small.7F[[8]](#footnote-8) In addition, it is not clear if the new program results in the largest 6 audit firms being reviewed annually.
* The auditing standards require audit firms and auditors to comply with the QMS and ethical standards, which are important in supporting audit quality. The Corporations Act requires auditors to comply with the QMS and ethical standards only to the extent they apply to the performance of an individual audit.8F[[9]](#footnote-9) As a result, ASIC can only enforce compliance for parts of the standards by the individual auditor, and not the firm.
* In the past ASIC have reviewed discreet components of a firm’s system of quality management, however this has been limited. ASIC did not review any components of the system of quality management in 2022/23 however have indicated they will do so in the future.
* The current regulatory framework in Australia is sometimes described as a co‑regulatory framework with the PABs being co‑regulators of auditors who are their members, with ASIC. However, the PABs do not have any statutory responsibilities or powers to oversee audit quality, and their quality review programs of their members are designed to be educative to support their members, and to promote continuous improvement. The programs are not designed to assess and report on audit quality.
* Each PAB has its own separate investigatory and disciplinary function. There is a perceived conflict of interest between the role of the PABs in managing the conduct of their members, given that membership fees are a significant source of income for the PABs and their role in representing the interests of their members. Whilst each PAB has adopted processes to enhance the independence of their disciplinary functions, the perceived conflict remains.
* Not all auditors are subject to regulatory oversight nor are all auditors required to be a member of a PAB.
* The ethical standards that the PABs’ members must comply with are set by the APESB and are based on their international equivalent. However, the APESB is not a statutory body and their standards do not have force of law. Also the APESB is funded by the PABs and the board members are drawn from the PABs, except for the Chairman who is required to be an independent person who is not a member of the PABs.9F[[10]](#footnote-10)
* The number of cases referred to the CADB is historically low. ASIC and APRA may refer RCAs to the CADB to sanction inadequate or improper performance of duties or the ‘fit and proper’ requirement.
* There are restrictions on the PABs’ ability to share information when they identify breaches.

# Recommendations

The FRC have a number of recommendations but acknowledge that some of these recommendations:

* may need further consideration to ensure they are workable and do not have any unintended consequences.
* may require additional or alternate sources of funding and legislative change.

The FRC welcomes further discussion with all stakeholders on the best way to achieve the intended outcomes of supporting the highest level of audit quality.

The FRC recommends:

|  |
| --- |
| 1. **ASIC’s program of reviewing audit files only when financial reports are known or suspected to be misstated, should be augmented with a program that selects audit files on a risk and rotational basis for review, with the overall objective to review all auditors over an established time period.** |

The Government should give consideration to whether ASIC undertakes this additional program and are funded to do so, or whether there should be a new independent body established whose legislated responsibility is to perform an audit surveillance program. There should also be consideration as to whether the audit surveillance program covers all RCAs over an established time period, or all auditors i.e., not just RCAs. This would require consideration as to whether all auditors should be required to be members of a PAB or some other minimum competency accreditation system.

This body could also be responsible for conducting surveillance of financial reporting, and surveillance of the disciplinary and enforcement processes currently being performed by ASIC and the PABs. There should be consideration as to whether this body also provides oversight of the broader accounting profession and consulting services.

|  |
| --- |
| 1. **ASIC should consider:**     1. Publishing an audit surveillance strategic plan with stated objectives and key performance indicators, including establishing a minimum coverage and cycle regarding the frequency of inspection of auditors.    2. Ongoing communication with the PABs as to the scope of the program to allow the PABs to consider the impact on their programs in particular which firms to review.    3. Including greater emphasis on oversight of the adequacy of audit firms’ compliance with the QMS and monitoring of compliance with ethical standards routinely in its surveillance program.10F[[11]](#footnote-11)    4. Allowing auditors to appeal through an internal independent process when they do not agree with a finding. This process should be transparent to the auditors.    5. Communicating its findings to the AUASB, AASB and APESB respectively on possible areas for improvements in their standards. |

These measures would enhance the transparency of ASIC’s program and its escalation policy. ASIC should also consider how to finalise reviews and report findings to the firms on a timelier basis.

|  |
| --- |
| 1. **In relation to their Quality Review Programs, the PABs should consider:**    1. The objectives of their programs and co‑ordination with ASIC.    2. Preparing public reports to provide detail of their monitoring and quality review programs including key performance indicators and results. This reporting should also confirm their compliance with IFAC’s SMO 1, and their conclusions on the audit quality of their members.    3. More comprehensive reporting on the scope and results of their programs to the FRC.11F[[12]](#footnote-12)    4. Communicating identified areas for improvements in the standards to the AUASB, AASB and APESB respectively. |

The nature of the PAB’s quality review programs may be revised depending on ASIC’s and the government’s response to recommendation 1.

|  |
| --- |
| 1. **The Government should give further consideration to requiring auditors to comply with relevant ethical standards and for compliance to be appropriately enforced through appropriate legislation.** |

This should include consideration as to whether ethical standards are set by an independent statutory body (consistent with the AASB and AUASB). This could help address any perceived conflict of interest. Consideration should also be given whether ASIC would be the most appropriate Government body to undertake the enforcement role.

|  |
| --- |
| 1. **The Government should give further holistic consideration, in consultation with the PABs, CADB and ASIC, to the PAB’s investigatory and disciplinary processes and whether they should be undertaken by a single independent body.** |

This would further manage perceived conflicts of interest and should include consideration of the PABs being required to refer auditors to the CADB when there appears there may be a failure to comply with s 1280(c) (fit and proper person) of the Corporations Act.

|  |
| --- |
| 1. **In relation to information sharing, the Government should consider the need for a holistic review to understand if there is a need for legislative reform to:**    1. Allow regulatory bodies (e.g., ASIC, ATO) and the PABs to communicate with each other when they become aware of matters of non‑compliance with legislation (except clearly minor), auditing standards and ethical standards.    2. Require audit firms to report identified (except for clearly minor) non‑compliance with auditing and ethical standards to ASIC, PABs (if members), and other relevant regulatory bodies (e.g., Tax Practitioners Board, ATO).    3. Streamline reporting to different bodies including regulatory bodies. |

Such reforms may reduce the risk of breaches to PABs’ by‑laws or legislation such as privacy laws. Appropriate communication between relevant regulatory bodies would also assist with resolving matters more quickly and effectively.

## Other observations

During the performance of this review the FRC observed other matters which we consider could be addressed to improve oversight of audit quality and compliance with ethical standards.

* Large audit firms’ corporate governance:
  + Large audit firms should be subject to annual reporting and audit requirements similar to those for listed companies under Chapter 2M of the *Corporations Act 2001* (Corporations Act) and the ASX Corporate Governance Principles. This would lead to more transparency on their financial results, remuneration practices and governance structures.
  + The large audit firms to review their corporate governance practices as well as ensuring there are appropriate and sufficient (e.g., majority) independent non‑executive personnel allocated to oversight roles including the governing body of the audit division and of the firm.
* Monitoring of the quality of work conducted by all auditors and other accountants:
  + Not all practicing auditors are required to be members of a PAB, and other than RCAs and SMSF auditors, are not subject to statutory oversight.
  + Not all professional accountants are required to be members of a PAB, and other than liquidators and tax practitioners12F[[13]](#footnote-13) are not subject to statutory oversight.
  + Therefore, there are parts of the profession where there is insufficient monitoring of the quality of their work. While our recommendations cover oversight of all auditors, further consideration is required as to how this can best be achieved, as well as how other accountants would be subject to oversight.
* Number of RCAs and competition in the audit market:
  + From our discussions with the audit firms and PABs we are aware that attracting and retaining talent in the audit profession is challenging. There has also been a fall in the number of RCAs in recent years.13F[[14]](#footnote-14) The FRC are not aware whether this is creating issues with supply of auditors or not. The FRC note that there should be consideration as to whether it is necessary to conduct a review to determine if the number of RCAs are adequate, and whether there need to be strategies to increase the supply of auditors or reduce the demand for RCAs. This should also be considered as Australia prepares for assurance over sustainability reporting.
  + The audit market is highly concentrated with the largest 4 firms auditing 95.50 per cent of the largest 200 companies by assets.14F[[15]](#footnote-15) In our research on their perceptions of audit quality discussed above, some ACCs commented that there is limited choice in appointing an audit firm as they require auditors with global scale and multi‑skills. The FRC note that there should be consideration as to whether it is necessary to conduct a review to determine if this is an issue that needs addressing. There should be consideration as to whether there may be barriers to greater competition.

# Overview of Framework

Australia’s legislative framework for oversight of RCAs and audit quality is mainly set out in the Corporations Act15F[[16]](#footnote-16) as follows:

* Auditors of entities required to report under the Corporations Act must be registered with ASIC (i.e., RCAs and Authorised Audit Companies).
* Auditors of SMSF are required to be registered with ASIC. The ATO is responsible for surveillance of SMSF auditors, and ASIC is responsible for determining whether auditors referred by the ATO should be deregistered or suspended.
* ASIC has regulatory responsibility for surveillance, investigation, and enforcement of the financial reporting requirements and audit requirements of RCAs.
* ASIC and APRA have powers to refer RCAs to the CADB who act as an expert independent disciplinary tribunal to consider applications for the cancellation or suspension of the registration of auditors.
* Auditors must comply with auditing standards issued by the AUASB which have force of law in the performance of an audit.
* The auditing standards require auditors16F[[17]](#footnote-17) and firms who conduct audit engagements, to comply with the QMS and with ethical standards issued by the APESB in the performance of an audit.

However, auditors of entities not covered by the Corporations Act or the Superannuation Industry (Supervision Act) 1993 (SIS Act) are not subject to regulatory oversight by ASIC or other government regulators. In addition, not all auditors are required to be members of a PAB.

All members of a PAB are required:

* To have a CPP if they provide services to the public for reward17F[[18]](#footnote-18). This includes auditors of entities not required to report under the Corporations Act.
* To comply with ethical standards issued by the APESB.

The PABs also have programs to monitor their members’ compliance with their by‑laws and the auditing and ethical standards. The effectiveness of the PABs’ quality review programs to monitor their members is not overseen by an independent body.

Similar to auditors, not all accountants are required to be registered with a government agency or a regulator, and there is no requirement to be a member of a PAB.

# Education and Registration of Accountants and Auditors

Each PAB has eligibility criteria for admittance to membership being an accredited degree or qualification plus successfully completing their specific post‑graduate programs and relevant work experience.

The PABs require all members who provide services to the public to complete a Public Practice Program, or equivalent, which includes modules covering ethical and regulatory obligations. Once a member has a CPP there are ongoing obligations to maintain appropriate, sufficient professional indemnity insurance, and to complete CPD requirements which is are at least 12018F[[19]](#footnote-19) hours of relevant professional development activity in each rolling three‑year period. The PABs have recently mandated that the CPD must include ethics training for members.19F[[20]](#footnote-20) Compliance with these obligations is monitored through their quality review programs and in addition the PABs select members randomly to check they are in compliance with the CPD requirements.

* Auditors of certain entities must be registered with ASIC as an RCA. The following legislation requires certain entities to be audited by an RCA:
* Most entities that report under Chapter 2M and Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act.
* Those charities required to prepare an audited report under the Australian Charities and Not‑for‑profits Commission Act 2012 (ACNC Act).20F[[21]](#footnote-21)
* Co‑operatives National Law.21F[[22]](#footnote-22)

There are numerous State and Territory Legislation with different requirements and these often require that auditors must be an RCA or a member of an PAB. However, there may be instances where an audit is required but there is no minimum registration or qualifications and experience required of the auditor22F[[23]](#footnote-23).

To be registered with ASIC, RCAs must satisfy the requirements of s1280 of the Corporations Act which include requirements for qualifications, experience, and being a fit and proper person. Conditions can be imposed by ASIC for ongoing registration as an RCA as to continuing education, professional indemnity insurance and engagement quality assurance. Refer to ASIC’s [RG 180 Auditor Registration](https://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/regulatory-guides/rg-180-auditor-registration/) for further information.

The criteria for initial and ongoing registration as an RCA is a high level of qualification and is intended to ensure that only those with the required skills have that designation. Auditors who are not RCAs may perform audits where permitted by the relevant legislation. The PABs have their own restrictions on what types of engagements members can undertake based on their qualifications.

The Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 also requires SMSF auditors to be registered with ASIC which is a separate and distinct accreditation from an RCA.

The ATO is responsible for surveillance of SMSF auditors, and ASIC is responsible for determining whether auditors referred by the ATO should be deregistered or suspended.

Registered SMSF auditors have reporting requirements to both the SMSF trustees and the ATO.

# The Audit Firms

Audit firms and auditors must comply with relevant regulation contained in the Corporations Act, auditing standards, ethical standards and their relevant PAB regulations.

## How Audit Firms Monitor Audit Quality and Compliance with Professional Standards

The FRC met with the assurance and quality leaders from the largest 6 audit firms and a small number of mid‑tier and smaller firms, to understand how they support and monitor audit quality. Each firm we met with emphasised that audit quality, and compliance with auditing standards was extremely important and a high priority for leadership, and there has been a significant focus and investment on initiatives and processes to improve quality.

### Systems of Quality Management

All firms23F[[24]](#footnote-24) that perform audits or other assurance engagements must comply with the recently enhanced QMS issued by the AUASB which came into effect in 2023.24F[[25]](#footnote-25) The QMS are designed to improve the robustness of firms’ systems of quality management to support compliance with ASAs and applicable legal and regulatory requirements.

The QMS reinforce that ‘quality management is not a separate function of the firm; it is the integration of a culture that demonstrates a commitment to quality with the firm’s strategy, operational activities and business processes’.25F[[26]](#footnote-26) The QMS require the firm’s leadership (i.e., CEO or equivalent) to have ultimate responsibility and accountability for quality. In addition to supporting and monitoring supporting audit quality there are requirements relevant to:

* Compliance with and responding to breaches with the professional and ethical standards.
* Audit quality in the performance of individual audit engagements.
* Quality review programs.
* Continuous improvement through identification and responding to root causes of identified deficiencies.

All the audit firms the FRC met with advised that whilst they already had systems of quality management in place, the new QMS have required an enhancement in their quality controls.

In addition, audit firms report that they have invested in the following to improve audit quality:

* Continual staff training on technical and ethical standards.
* Technology solutions being used in the conduct of audits which enhance audit quality as they allow analysis of entire populations and data sets. This is particularly relevant for larger firms and audit clients.
* A number of internal quality reviews which are run at different stages of the audit (i.e., during and after) and for different purposes. Internal review programs of the largest firms on completed engagements are taken seriously and are run with an element of independence as much as practical. For example, being run by a partner from another office including from overseas.
* Accountability frameworks which take into account findings from external and internal quality reviews in partner and staff performance reviews. Depending on severity, negative review findings will impact remuneration.
* Compliance with auditing and ethical standards is also taken seriously and the largest firms have processes in place for staff to confirm their compliance and to identify breaches.

### Quality Review Programs

In addition to internal quality review programs, audit firms and auditors are subject to some level of external oversight to monitor compliance with regulation through the following:

* Reviews by representatives of their global network on a rotation basis   
  (depending on the structure)
* ASIC’s audit surveillance program
* International regulators, being the PCAOB (United States) and CPAB (Canada)
* PABs’ quality review programs of their systems of quality controls on a cyclical basis.

When an audit firm belongs to a network firm they are subject to monitoring activities by the network on their systems of quality management and often reviews of engagement files. These are done on a rotational basis.

ASIC has in the past reviewed selected audit files of the largest 6 audit firms annually, and audit files of other audit firms of listed entities based on their risk‑based sample. However, as noted in the *ASIC’s Oversight of Auditors* section of this report ASIC has recently changed its inspection program and it is not clear if the largest 6 audit firms will continue to be reviewed every year.

The audit firms we met with provided feedback that they whilst they did not always agree with ASIC’s findings they agree that ASIC’s audit surveillance program has resulted in an improvement in audit quality. They also provided the following feedback where ASIC’s program could be enhanced:

* More attention should be given to firm wide quality management systems which are designed to support audit quality.
* ASIC focus on a small part of the file and do not review the file more holistically.
* The relative inexperience of the inspectors.
* There being no transparent escalation process for firms if they strongly disagree with the findings in the future.

Note that ASIC do not agree with all elements of this feedback.

The PABs review their members on a rotational basis which under the IFAC’s SMO 1 should be every 3 years for audit firms of PIEs and 6 years for other audit firms. We understand that the PABs have conducted reviews of the largest 6 audit firms on a periodic basis. In addition, the PABs monitor whether its members have quality control systems in place. The PABs do not review audit files at the 6 largest audit firms as they consider this an overlap with ASIC’s program. Refer to the *Professional Accounting Bodies Oversight of Auditors* section of this report for more information on their programs.

### Transparency Reports

Audit firms who perform more than ten audits of listed entities are required to prepare a Transparency Report26F[[27]](#footnote-27) to communicate certain information relevant to the firm’s structure and their systems of quality management. Refer to ASIC [Information Sheet 184](https://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/financial-reporting-and-audit/auditors/audit-transparency-reports/) for full details of the required reporting. The Transparency Reports are an opportunity for the audit firms to communicate matters relevant to management of quality with the objective to enhance confidence in the firm’s quality.27F[[28]](#footnote-28)

### Governance of the Audit Firms

The audit firms are usually large partnerships and managed by executive boards and governed by governance boards, members of which are usually partners. Concerns have been raised as to whether structure of the large firms means they are not subject to the provisions of Corporations Act and best practice corporate governance principles. For example, there may not be an appropriate level of independent governance and oversight, and that the Corporation Act’s provisions in relation to director’s duties and penalties do not apply.28F[[29]](#footnote-29)

The FRC discussed this with the audit firms and note that whilst some firms have introduced some non‑executive personnel to oversight roles there is no requirement for them to do so, and the involvement of non‑executives could be further enhanced. We note that there have been recent announcements from some large firms that they are introducing enhancements to their governance arrangements. We also note that there is a government inquiry into the structure of the firms which will be examining these matters.

# Professional Accounting Bodies Oversight of Auditors

Each PAB is a member of IFAC and is required to comply with IFAC’s [SMOs](https://www.ifac.org/knowledge-gateway/supporting-international-standards/publications/statements-membership-obligations-1-7). The SMOs provide clear benchmarks to IFAC member organisations and core competencies for PABs to serve and function in the public interest.

Each PAB currently maintains and monitors their members’ professional competence through:

* Eligibility for membership with academic criteria plus completion of their specific post‑graduate programs and relevant work experience.
* Providing ongoing training, guidance, and tools.
* CPD requirements.
* Quality review programs of individual members and firms.

## Quality Review Programs

The PABs are required to perform quality review programs which are governed by IFAC’s SMO 1. SMO 1 covers how to plan and perform quality assurance reviews of firms and individual members (including auditors) and take appropriate corrective action for non‑compliance. SMO1 allows PABs to give due consideration to quality review programs operated by other appointed authorities (e.g., ASIC) to ensure there is no undue overlap between the programs. The FRC understands that the 3 PABs in Australia conduct reviews of members who are auditors who they believe will not be reviewed by ASIC, and as a result, the PABs do not review engagement files of the largest 6 and some mid‑tier firms.

There is no formal agreement in place or communications between ASIC and the PABs, as to the scope of their programs. The FRC understand that ASIC communicate to the PABs which firms and files they have reviewed, however we consider this could be enhanced to include up front communication on the scope of their respective programs.

The PABs review all members with a CPP (generally the partner) and/or firms however each has a different program for auditors. SMO 1 allows the PABs to have different approaches to how they run their programs. Jurisdictions may adopt a cycle‑based, risk‑based, or mixed approach. SMO 1 details that generally, firms that perform audits of financial statements of PIEs should be reviewed at least every 3 years (6 years for firms that audit non‑PIEs). However, some firms may need to be reviewed more frequently, meaning that the cycle may be shortened, for example, when the results of the previous quality assurance review were less than satisfactory.

The PABs are required to perform ongoing self‑assessments of their compliance with each of the SMO requirements. However, the PABs do not report publicly whether they are in compliance with the SMOs including whether the number of reviews being performed on an annual basis is sufficient to meet the SMO 1 requirements.

The purpose of PABs’ quality review programs is educative and different to ASIC as the statutory regulator. The PABs’ reviews are a high‑level assessment of compliance with professional and technical standards. The quality review programs undertaken by each PAB:

* Are focused on supporting members and promoting continuous improvement.
* Monitor compliance with their by‑laws and professional standards.
* Ensure there is documentation to support that there is a system of quality management in place but may not critically assess whether this is in compliance with QMS.
* Consider whether there is documentation to support the auditor’s conclusions, however, do not substitute their judgement with the key judgements that were made by the auditor.
* Whilst slightly different for each PAB, measure the results as satisfactory/compliant, requires re‑review / non‑compliant, or unsatisfactory/disciplinary action required.

The FRC did not review the PABs’ quality review programs in detail, however, did review parts of the programs which guide the reviewer i.e., their programs/checklists, and note that they are comprehensive and include for the reviewer to check compliance with some of the Auditing Standards. However, there may be variations in the effectiveness of a review as it is dependent on the quality of the reviewer and the level of robustness in their approach.

As detailed in the *Audit Firms* section of this report, the PABs do not review audit files at the 6 largest audit firms as they consider this an overlap with ASIC’s program. They review the 6 largest firms on a periodic basis and review their overarching systems of quality management.

Only fundamental breaches of professional standards are referred to disciplinary action, and therefore only a small percentage of firms / auditors are referred to disciplinary action in any given year.

### Communication of results of Quality Review Programs

The PABs communicates the results of their quality review programs to members for educative purposes and encourage continuous improvement.

The PABs also communicate at a high level, the results of their programs to the FRC and publicly in either a separate publication available on their website, and / or their Annual Report.

However, the reporting to the FRC and available publicly could be enhanced to provide more detail on:

* An overview of their program and key performance indicators ie. how often they review members etc.
* The results including the auditing standards which are not being complied with.
* Compliance with SMO 1.
* Whether the findings indicate a broader issue with audit quality which should be addressed.

This increased transparency may assist with addressing any perception of a conflict of interest in the PABs assessing the quality of their members, and the robustness of their programs.

### Co‑regulators

The PABs are sometimes described as co‑regulators of auditors who are their members, with ASIC. However, the PABs do not have any statutory powers or responsibilities in regard to audit oversight and therefore are not co‑regulators. Whilst IOSCO’s principles detail that if providing audit oversight, the PABs should be overseen by the regulator, this is not applicable in Australia. In some overseas jurisdictions there are legislated responsibilities for the PABs, or the regulator has the authority to direct the work of the PABs. For example, in New Zealand there is legislation29F[[30]](#footnote-30) requiring the NZICA, and CPA to monitor registered auditors and audit firms, promote, and monitor the competence of their members and develop an investigative and disciplinary system.30F[[31]](#footnote-31) Similar arrangements exist in the UK for audits of unlisted entities.

### Monitoring Members’ Compliance with PAB’s Regulations and By‑laws

As part of the annual renewal, members confirm they have been in compliance with the by‑laws and specifically CPD requirements and they have notified the PAB of any disclosure event. The PABs assess compliance with their by‑laws as part of their Quality Review Program.

The PABs also review CPD records as part of their Quality Review Program and in addition check a sample of members records on a periodic basis.

### Members’ Disclosure and Notification Events

The PABs have slightly different regulations and by‑laws but have member notification and disclosure events. Notification events are those that make a member liable to disciplinary sanctions, whilst a disciplinary event are those of a serious nature such as an indictable offence, for example, an offence under the Tax Administration Act, or is insolvent.

### CA ANZ Professional Conduct Framework Review

In July 2022 CA ANZ commenced a periodic PCFR with the final [report](https://www.charteredaccountantsanz.com/news-and-analysis/media-centre/press-releases/ca-anz-professional-conduct-framework-review) issued on 7 June 2023. The PCFR examined the alignment of the Australian and New Zealand By‑Laws and Rules, the composition, powers and structure of the PCC and tribunals including how breaches of ethics are communicated to members, member protocols and guidance on disclosure obligations and the interaction between academic misconduct in the CA program with the By‑Laws and Rules.

The findings were that the Disciplinary Framework met or exceeded the standards set by IFAC and international and peer benchmarks. There were a number of recommendations which CA ANZ have accepted and has committed to implement. Many recommendations, require amendments to By‑Laws and member approval, which has now occurred. A recommendation relevant to this review is an expansion of the role of the PCOC to include a broader oversight role in respect of monitoring members’ compliance. This also aligns the PCOC’s responsibilities with NZICA who has a statutory responsibility to maintain and monitor compliance with, and enforce, professional and ethical standards.

### Professional Standards Scheme

The PABs have schemes approved by the [PSC](https://www.psc.gov.au/consumer-information/what-is-a-scheme#:~:text=A%20professional%20standards%20scheme%20is,who%20use%20their%20members%27%20services.) under professional standards legislation. This is very important to the PABs as their members potentially can participate in the Professional Standards (Limitation of Liability) Scheme.

The professional standards schemes are in place to support associations (i.e., PABs) to improve and maintain professional standards and conduct of their members. The PSC conduct ongoing compliance and requires the PABs to submit an Annual Professional Standards Report on their actions, policies and decisions relevant to how they improve and maintain professional standards. Some of the PABs indicated that this reporting is extensive and other bodies may benefit from having access to this.

The PSC reviews the PABs at least every 5 years. This includes matters such as their membership entrance requirements, conduct and discipline processes, and continuous education.

# ASIC’s Oversight of Auditors

ASIC has regulatory responsibility for surveillance, investigation, and enforcement of the financial reporting and audit requirements of RCAs. ASIC is responsible for administering the requirements of the Corporations Act as it relates to auditor independence (Divisions 3, 4 and 5 of Part 2M.4) and audit quality (Division 3 of Part 2M.3). This is done through ASIC’s audit surveillance program which has an objective to promote the improvement and maintenance of audit quality. ASIC focuses on audits of financial reports of PIEs prepared under the Corporations Act.31F[[32]](#footnote-32)

The audit surveillances program mainly consists of risk‑based reviews and ASIC also perform separate surveillances as a result of complaints or linked to other information received, or another investigation.

### Change in Audit Surveillance Program

In November 2022 ASIC announced that it would combine the financial reporting and audit surveillance programs to focus on the entire financial reporting chain. ASIC now routinely select audit files for surveillance where there is a known or suspected material misstatement of the financial report. Audit files may also be selected based on other available intelligence.

On 18 October 2023 ASIC released the results of this program in the [Annual Financial Reporting and Surveillance Report 2022–23](https://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/reports/rep-774-annual-financial-reporting-and-audit-surveillance-report-2022-23/) report. ASIC’s report summarised the findings from both financial reports and audit files and emphasises the role of preparers and auditors in improving the quality of financial reporting and audit. As a result of the new approach there has been a reduction in the number of audit files reviewed from 45 in 2021/22 to 15 in 2022/23. Of the 15 files 11 had findings. Due to the small number of audit files reviewed ASIC have not reported which firms have been reviewed and have not issued individual firm reports.

### Prior Year’s Approach and Results

ASIC’s previous program covered the largest 6 audit firms, and a small number of other firms and they produced individual reports for the largest 6 audit firms. ASIC used a risk‑based approach to select engagements and key audit areas for review.

It is not possible to compare the 2022/23 results to previous year results due to the small number of files reviewed and ASIC have not reported all the information which they have reported in prior years. The following table summarises the number and results for [2021–22](https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/find-a-media-release/2022-releases/22-296mr-asic-reports-on-audit-inspection-findings-for-12-months-to-30-june-2022/) and 2020–21:

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | **Negative findings from reviews of key audit areas in audit files,  by firm** | | | | | | | |
|  | | Audit Firm | | |  | | | | |
| BDO | Deloitte | EY | GT | KPMG | PwC | Other | Total |
| FY 2021–22 | Audit files reviewed | 3 | 5 | 8 | 3 | 8 | 8 | 10 | **45** |
| Key audit areas | 10 | 18 | 26 | 9 | 27 | 24 | 32 | **146** |
| Areas with negative findings | 2 | 9 | 4 | 4 | 13 | 4 | 16 | **52** |
| FY 2020–21 | Audit files reviewed | 3 | 5 | 8 | 3 | 8 | 8 | 10 | **45** |
| Key audit areas | 10 | 17 | 30 | 11 | 27 | 20 | 34 | **149** |
| Areas with negative findings | 2 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 8 | 5 | 20 | **47** |

It is worth noting that the results continued to ‘worsen’ despite the firm’s efforts to improve audit quality, however we are aware that the results are sometimes subjective in nature and the firms do not always agree with ASIC’s conclusions. Further, the more sophisticated the risk‑based selection of files by ASIC, the more likely that a file selected will have a negative finding. Hence the results do not provide evidence as to the state of audit quality across the audit profession more broadly.

The FRC considers the number of audit files reviewed is small given there are over 3000 RCAs (of which over 500 audit listed entities) and 200 (of which 50 audit listed companies) authorised audit companies in Australia.32F[[33]](#footnote-33)

### External Independent Panel

As detailed in Information Sheet 224, ASIC have an external independent panel which they may choose to consult to review the method of measuring and reporting findings. ASIC may also choose to discuss the conclusions reached (including firm responses) on a small number of anonymised findings where significant judgement is required. However, ASIC makes the decisions on individual findings and the panel:

* does not review audit working papers
* does not engage with the audit firm and the audit firms are not made aware of which matters were discussed by the panel.

ASIC communicates the findings from each audit surveillance:

* to the audit firm who is asked to commit to remedial actions which are agreed to by ASIC.
* to directors of the entity33F[[34]](#footnote-34) (from 1 July 2022)
* in a public report as detailed above.

In the past few years, the largest 6 firm individual reports were released by ASIC and the firms themselves.

The impact of a negative finding is:

* The firm may need to perform remedial actions as communicated to ASIC.
* The firm is required to perform root cause analysis as part of a continuous improvement process.34F[[35]](#footnote-35)
* The repercussions for the partner are determined by the firm and may impact partner remuneration depending on the severity of the finding.
* ASIC may consider whether to take enforcement action, however this is not common.

ASIC assesses whether sufficient appropriate audit evidence was obtained to support the auditor’s conclusions, and whether they agree with key judgements made by the auditor. Audits necessarily involve the application of professional judgement and the audit firms do not always agree with ASIC’s conclusions. ASIC are of the view that they do not raise negative findings where they consider that it is due to a legitimate difference in professional judgement.

### Separate Surveillances

In addition to the risk‑based surveillances ASIC may review audits based on specific concerns such as complaints or other intelligence, including corporate collapses. Findings from these have resulted in enforcement outcomes, with auditors removed from practice or having their registration cancelled through enforceable undertakings and decisions of the CADB.

There have been very few court actions against RCAs for contraventions of the Corporations Act due to difficulties with proving alleged breaches and relatively low penalties however penalties have increased recently.

Refer to the [FRC’s Auditor Disciplinary review](https://treasury.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-04/p2019-t374191-review.pdf) for further detail on ASIC’s audit enforcement powers and processes.

### Review of QMS and Compliance with Ethical Standards

ASIC’s program focuses on key audit areas of selected audit engagements. In addition in prior years, ASIC have conducted reviews of elements of the QMS such as, processes to manage conflicts of interest and approaches to firm governance and accountability for audit quality in [2019/2020](https://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/reports/rep-677-audit-inspection-report-1-july-2019-to-30-june-2020/), processes to manage culture and talent in [2020/2021](https://download.asic.gov.au/media/vosb0x4p/rep709-published-30-november-2021.pdf), and root cause analysis in [2021/2022](https://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/reports/rep-739-root-cause-analysis-audit-firm-thematic-review/). However, ASIC do not routinely review a firm’s QMS more widely, and whether it is in compliance with the Auditing Standards, or processes to manage compliance with ethical standards. We understand that during 2022/23 ASIC had high level discussions with the firms on their implementation of the QMS, and as reported in the [Annual Financial Reporting and Surveillance Report 2022–23](https://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/reports/rep-774-annual-financial-reporting-and-audit-surveillance-report-2022-23/) they did not perform any thematic reviews of QMS in 2022/23. ASIC have indicated that they will be reviewing aspects of the firms’ QMS in 2024–25.

### International Regulator Organisations Principles

IOSCO is an international body recognised as the global standard setter for the securities sector. IOSCO has principles that international audit regulators should comply with. The following are relevant:

* IOSCO’s [*Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation*](about:blank)principle 19 states that Auditors should be subject to adequate levels of oversight.
* IOSCO’s [*Principles for Auditor Oversight*](about:blank)includes a list of general principles for oversight of audit firms and auditors that audit financial statements of companies whose securities are publicly traded in the capital markets. The following are relevant:
  + Principle 8 III – a mechanism should exist for a body to provide oversight over the quality and implementation of auditing, independence, and ethical standards used in the jurisdiction, as well as audit quality control environments.
  + Principle 8 IV – a mechanism should exist to require auditors to be subject to the discipline of an auditor oversight body that is independent of the audit profession, or, if a professional body acts as the oversight body, is overseen by an independent body. Such an auditor oversight body must operate in the public interest, and have an appropriate membership, an adequate charter of responsibilities and powers, and adequate funding that is not under the control of the auditing profession, to carry out those responsibilities.

IFIAR35F[[36]](#footnote-36) is the International Organization of Independent Audit Regulators. IFIAR’s [*Core Principles for Independent Audit Regulators*](https://www.ifiar.org/?wpdmdl=14848) seek to promote effective independent audit oversight globally. ASIC is a member of IFIAR. The following are relevant:

* Principle 3 – Transparency should include the publication of annual work plans and activity reports, including the outcome of inspections either in the aggregate or on a firm‑by‑firm basis.
* Principle 8 – Audit regulators should establish a minimum cycle regarding the frequency of inspections, with the option of conducting ad‑hoc inspections when the need arises.
* Principle 9 – Audit regulators should ensure that a risk‐based inspections program is in place.
* Principle 10 – Audit regulators should ensure that inspections include effective procedures for both firm‑wide and audit engagement file reviews.

### Comparison with some other International Regulators

The FRC compared ASIC’s surveillance program to equivalent programs of PCAOB, UK FRC, New Zealand’s FMA and CPAB (refer to Appendix 1). In addition, the FRC reviewed IFIAR’s [2022 Survey of Inspection Findings](https://www.ifiar.org/?wpdmdl=15294) which details the results and scope of members’ inspection program. From this the FRC noted:

* In addition to reviewing engagement files some international audit regulators review the firm’s system of quality management as they serve as the foundation for executing and monitoring quality audits. As detailed above ASIC have in the past reviewed discrete elements of the firms’ system of quality management and did not review any in 2022/23 and does not review the firm’s system of quality management more widely. The Corporations Act s 307A requires auditors to comply with the auditing standards in the conduct of an audit and QMS are not specifically relevant in the conduct of an audit. Therefore, ASIC’s scope is individual audits and not the audit firms’ systems of quality management.
* Other regulators have detailed transparent plans and KPIs on how often auditors (the entire population in scope) are reviewed.

ASIC have measured their findings by reference to key audit areas on audit files reviewed whereas IFIAR measures findings by reference to audit engagements as a whole.

### Small Number of Reviews

As the regulator, ASIC is the body with legislative responsibility for oversight of audit quality. The number of reviews being conducted has continued to decrease over the last few years and is now only [15 files](https://www.afr.com/companies/professional-services/big-four-name-and-shame-audit-quality-reprieve-criticised-20230815-p5dwl0) in 2022/23. Given that there are approximately 190036F[[37]](#footnote-37) entities on the Australian Stock Exchange the number of files reviewed is very low. ASIC is transparent that that the small number of files reviewed does not allow them to conclude on the quality of audits in Australia. However, the FRC consider that number of reviews in both the current and recent years raises questions as to whether there is sufficient coverage of the audit market by ASIC, to enable sufficient monitoring of audit quality in Australia. The FRC also note that some overseas regulators have stated objectives of reviewing all auditors in a particular time frame, for example every year, or every 3 years. Refer to Appendix 1 for a comparison of ASIC’s program to some international regulators.

### Quality of the Program

Prior to the recent reduction in ASIC’s audit file selections and the discontinuation of reporting of findings by firm, the FRC understands that the ASIC program provided a deterrent to poor quality as:

* there is media and Parliamentary attention to the negative findings.
* there are financial penalties for audit partners from a negative ASIC review imposed by the audit firm.
* directors are notified of negative findings (from 1 July 2022).
* firms are concerned about the possibility of losing or not winning audits based on higher levels of negative findings compared to competitors.
* the largest 6 global firms have in the past focussed on the results of local firms which affect an IFIAR target to reduce inspection findings across 25 IFIAR members and the largest 6 firms in aggregate.

# The CADB

The CADB is an independent statutory body established under Part 11 of the ASIC Act. The primary role is to act as an expert disciplinary tribunal to consider applications for the cancellation or suspension of the registration of auditors under the Corporations Act.

CADB jurisdiction is limited to matters referred to it by ASIC and APRA, and to matters involving RCAs. Its functions and powers are conferred to it by sections of the ASIC Act and Corporations Act.

The functions and powers of the Board in relation to applications are to determine whether a RCA:

* has failed to carry out their duties and functions adequately and properly.
* has breached certain requirements under the Corporations Act.
* is not a fit and proper person.
* has failed to comply with a condition of their registration.
* is subject to disqualification.
* is otherwise ineligible to remain registered.

Refer to the FRC’s [Auditor Disciplinary review](https://treasury.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-04/p2019-t374191-review.pdf) for an overview of the CADB’s process when investigating a case.

When cases are referred to the CADB they evaluate the appropriateness of the auditor’s work compared to professional standards without the need for expert evidence. This evaluation is valuable in contributing to understanding what appropriate standards of competency for auditors are, and how audit quality can be improved. The CADB publish its decisions which provides useful information to regulators and others.

Number of cases that have been referred the CADB since 2019/20 by nature of sanction:

| Result | 19–20 | 20–21 | 21–22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Registration cancelled | ‑ | 937F[[38]](#footnote-38) | 1 |
| Registration suspended | ‑ | ‑ | 1 |
| Admonition | ‑ | ‑ | ‑ |
| Reprimand | ‑ | ‑ | ‑ |
| Undertaking required to be given | ‑ | ‑ | 1 |
| Dismissed | ‑ | ‑ | ‑ |
| Withdrawn by ASIC | ‑ | 2738F[[39]](#footnote-39) | ‑ |
| **Total** | **‑** | **36** | **3** |

Source: [CADB Annual Report 2021–2022](https://www.cadb.gov.au/media/o2zhngk3/cadb-annual-report-2021-2022.pdf)

The CADB cancelled the registration of one auditor in 2022. The number of cases referred to the CADB continues to be low due to ASIC’s preference to resolve cases before referring to CADB. In addition, APRA have never referred cases to CADB as it can achieve its objectives using other tools.

As detailed in its [submission](https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Corporations_and_Financial_Services/ConsultancyFirms/Submissions) to the PJC Inquiry: Ethics and Professional Accountability: Structural Challenges in the Audit, Assurance and Consultancy Industry, the CADB have noted that they are underutilised as ASIC and APRA do not refer cases to them frequently. ‘… the number of matters that have been considered by CADB is insufficient to fully realise either CADB’s potential to meaningfully impact regulatory settings in relation to auditors or the full scope of its legislative function.’ The CADB recommended there is consideration of:

* an accountability framework or a supervisory body that monitors utilisation by ASIC and APRA of CADB’s jurisdiction.
* expanding the entities that may make applications to CADB regarding RCAs.

# The APESB

The APESB sets professional and ethical standards with which accounting professionals who are members of the PABs must comply. The APESB is a non‑statutory body that was created by the Australian PABs to develop, issue and maintain high‑quality professional and ethical standards. The APESB’s standards are based on the standards set by the International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants. The APESB’s standards do not carry the force of law, except those which are relevant to the performance of an audit, which are legally enforceable by virtue of being referenced in auditing standards.

As a standard‑setter, the APESB does not have responsibility for monitoring and enforcing compliance with their standards as this is the responsibility PABs (for their members) and ASIC. However, ASIC’s audit surveillance program does not routinely focus on the firms’ systems to monitor compliance with APESB’s standards. Also, as detailed previously in this report ASIC does not have the powers to enforce compliance with the APESB standards. The PABs review their member firm’s system of quality management which include processes to monitor compliance with the professional and ethical standards.

Compliance with the professional and ethical standards are vitally important and recent controversies indicate that more regulation is required in this area.

# The AASB and AUASB

The FRC is responsible for overseeing the AASB and AUASB’s standards setting processes.

The AASB and AUASB are independent non‑corporate Commonwealth entities of the Australian Government responsible for setting accounting and auditing standards.

The AASB and AUASB’s functions are set out in the *Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act* *2001*, and both have extensive due process frameworks to ensure that their standards and guidance are developed, issued and maintained with proper regard to the public interest, are principles‑based, of a high quality, clearly stated and concise and meet the needs of stakeholders. The AASB and AUASB standards are based on, and consistent with the standards set by the equivalent international standards setting bodies.

Similar to the APESB, the AASB and AUASB do not have responsibility for monitoring and enforcing compliance as this is the responsibility of ASIC and the PABs (for their members).

While audit and assurance practitioners have the primary responsibility for quality audits and assurance, the AUASB sets auditing and assurance standards that play an important role in promoting and supporting audit and assurance quality. The AUASB has a strategic objective of, in conjunction with the FRC, identifying and implementing initiatives designed to enhance audit quality in Australia. The AUASB seeks to understand from stakeholders such as regulators, auditors and accounting bodies where the auditing, assurance and quality management standards may need to be improved or enhanced.

# Directors and Audit Committees

Directors have a primary responsibility for the quality of financial reporting, which is supported by high quality audits. Directors and in particular audit committees have key roles to play in supporting audit quality. The importance of their roles are emphasised in ASIC Information Sheet 196 – [Audit quality – The role of directors and audit committees](https://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/financial-reporting-and-audit/auditors/audit-quality-the-role-of-directors-and-audit-committees/).

The directors’ role in ensuring the independence of the auditor is governed by the requirements in the Corporations Act which requires that the directors’ report include:

* the auditor’s independence declaration
* for a listed company, a statement about whether the provision of non‑audit services by the auditor during the financial year is compatible with the general standard of auditor independence in the Corporations Act, and whether that statement is consistent with the advice of the audit committee (section 300(11B)–(11E)).

Many entities have an audit committee whose role is to assist the board of directors to fulfill its corporate governance and oversight responsibilities in areas including annual financial reporting and oversight of the external auditor. The ASX Corporate Governance Principles also state the role of the audit committee is usually to review and make recommendations to the board in relation to:

* the appointment or removal of the external auditor
* the fees payable to the auditor for audit and non‑audit work
* the rotation of the audit engagement partner
* the scope and adequacy of the external audit
* the independence and performance of the external auditor
* any proposal for the external auditor to provide non‑audit services and whether it might compromise independence of the external auditor.39F[[40]](#footnote-40)

In recognition of the integral role in the oversight of their external auditor, the FRC and the AUASB have conducted 3 separate research projects into understanding the perspectives of ACCs on audit quality. The findings40F[[41]](#footnote-41) were that over 90 per cent of ACCs who participated rated their auditor above average or excellent. This indicates that ACCs are satisfied with audit quality. It is worth noting that the ACCs who engaged in this research were mainly from large ASX entities.

Nonetheless, some audit committees expressed concern in relation to the lack of depth of the audit market and limited choice companies have. We note that the UK also have observed this market concentration issue and recommendations have been made to address the issue in that jurisdiction. We note that the size of the largest auditing firms in the Australian market may suggest a level of market concentration and may warrant a review.

In addition, the AUASB and AICD jointly prepared the [Periodic Comprehensive Review of the External Auditor](https://www.auasb.gov.au/media/oqyaiuiz/periodic-comprehensive-review-external-auditor-final.pdf) to provide guidance on matters where a formal review on audit quality by an incumbent auditor is prepared (which supplements [ASIC Information Sheet 196](https://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/financial-reporting-and-audit/auditors/audit-quality-the-role-of-directors-and-audit-committees/)).

Appendix 1 – Comparison of ASIC, PCAOB, UK FRC, NZ FMA and CPAB

|  | **ASIC** | **PCAOB** | **UK FRC** | **NZ FMA** | **CPAB** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Objective of program | To promote the improvement and maintenance of audit quality. | To assess compliance with the Sarbanes‑Oxley Act, the rules of the Board, the rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and professional standards. | To monitor and promote improvements in the quality of auditing in the UK. | To promote and facilitate the development of fair, efficient and transparent financial markets. | To promote audit quality through proactive regulation, robust audit assessments, dialogue with domestic and international stakeholders, and practicable insights that inform capital market participants and contribute to public confidence in the integrity of financial reporting. |
| Scope of program | Audits of financial reports of PIEs prepared under the *Corporations Act 2001.* | Registered Public Accounting Firms (approx. 1700) i.e., auditors of public companies. | Firms that undertake statutory audits of PIEs and certain other entities. | Registered audit firms (Financial Markets Conduct Act Reporting Entities). | Registered public accounting firms. |
| Delegate to PABs? | No. | No. Private companies are not subject to oversight by the PCAOB. Auditors of private companies must be members of AICPA which is a PAB and conducts a Peer Review Program. | FRC is the authority with responsibility for oversight of statutory auditors, however, can delegate tasks to Recognised Supervisory Bodies (accounting bodies). Monitoring of statutory audits outside the scope of FRC inspections of listed entity audits is delegated to the Recognised Supervisory Bodies under a series of Delegation Agreements. [Link](https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/ac6c5dc2-3087-4e95-8b2c-ce78391a3ef5/DELEGATION-AGREEMENT-BETWEEN-FRC-AND-ICAEW.pdf) to example of agreement. The agreements are extensive, and accounting bodies must report their plans and results etc. | There are currently 2  accredited PAB in New Zealand: The NZICA41F[[42]](#footnote-42), and CPA. The responsibilities of these bodies are in legislation42F[[43]](#footnote-43) which requires the bodies to monitor registered auditors and audit firms, promote, and monitor the competence of their members and develop an investigative and disciplinary system. They are also required to report the results to the FMA for assessing their performance against their responsibilities. The FMA has the power to conduct reviews to assess that they have met their responsibilities.  Refer to [Accredited‑body‑report‑2022](https://www.fma.govt.nz/assets/Reports/Accredited-body-report-2022-CPA-Australia.pdf)  and [NZICA\_accredited\_body\_report\_2020](https://www.fma.govt.nz/assets/Reports/NZICA-accredited-body-report-2020.pdf) | There are several provincial and regional bodies that represent the Canadian Chartered Professional Accountant membership. The CPA Practice Review program requires the review of all registered PAFs and PSPs who perform assurance, compilation and/or tax services. |
| Frequency of reviews | Previously reviewed Big 6 firms annually. Others on a random basis but no publicly stated target for other auditors.  It is not clear if the Big 6 will be reviewed annually in the new program. | If a firm provides audit opinions for more than 100 issuers, the PCAOB inspects them annually.  If a firm provides audit opinions for less than 100 issuers, the PCAOB, in general, inspects them at least triennially. | Larger firms are inspected annually while other firms are generally inspected once every 3 years. In certain cases, the inspection cycle can be extended to 6 years. | Previously did each firm at least every 3 years and now starting from the 2023–2024 review cycle, every licensed firm will be reviewed each year.  The FMA are transparent about their program and issue periodically their Auditor Regulation and Oversight Plan. Refer to [Auditor Regulation and Oversight Plan 2023–2026. (fma.govt.nz)](https://www.fma.govt.nz/assets/Reports/Auditor-Regulation-and-Oversight-Plan-2023-2026.pdf) | All firms that audit 100 or more reporting issuers are reviewed each year and firms that audit between 50 and 99 reporting issuers are reviewed at least every 2 years. Remaining firms are inspected periodically based on CPAB’s risk analysis. |
| How are audits selected? | Previously Audit engagements and key audit areas for review in our audit surveillances using a risk‑based approach. This means that ASIC generally select some of the more complex, demanding, and challenging audits, and some more significant or higher risk areas of the financial reports.  From 2022–23 the financial reporting and audit surveillance programs have been combined and ASIC now routinely select audit files for surveillance where there is a known or suspected material misstatement of the financial report. They may select other audits from other intelligence. | Selects audits for inspection using both risk‑based and random methods. Most selections are based on an internal evaluation of audits believed to present a heightened risk of material misstatement. Focus is also placed on risk factors including economic trends, industry developments, market‑capitalization size and/or changes, audit firm and partner, and inspection history. The remaining audits are selected randomly to provide an element of unpredictability. | In selecting individual audits to inspect, the UK FRC take account of a wide range of factors including periodic coverage of FTSE 350 constituents, the assessed level of risk in relation to individual audited entities and priority sectors for review announced by the FRC. | Audit quality reviews are risk based. This means that they may perform unscheduled reviews of audit firms and select audit firms and identify key audit areas for reviews based on specific risk factors. | Identifies and rates reporting issuers and audit firms using a risk‑based approach. |
| Size of the inspection team43F[[44]](#footnote-44) | 13 | 460 | 128 | Not disclosed. | 37 |
| The number of files reviewed in 2022 | 4544F[[45]](#footnote-45) (15 reviewed in  2022–2023) | 71045F[[46]](#footnote-46) | 148 | 2546F[[47]](#footnote-47) | 13247F[[48]](#footnote-48) |
| What is reviewed within a file? | Key audit areas in the audit working papers for selected audit engagements. ASIC may also assess key aspects of audit firm quality control systems over audits of financial reports. This is based on direct reviews of the design and operation of those systems or evidence from audit files. | While inspections vary by firm, the PCAOB may focus on an auditor’s risk assessment processes, financial reporting and audit areas affected by economic trends or pressures, audit areas that present challenges and significant risk, new accounting standards, and areas of recurring audit deficiencies. | Focus on the quality of the audit work performed in the areas selected for review, the appropriateness of key audit judgments made, and the sufficiency and appropriateness of the audit evidence obtained. | Focus is on key audit areas chosen based on common findings identified by international audit regulators and recent reviews. The reviews for the next 3 years will focus on the audit firms system of quality management, planning of the audit, execution of the audit, reporting of the audit and any significant matters. | The entire audit file is not inspected. Two to four focus areas are selected as a basis for assessing the quality of audit work in a selected file. Core areas such as materiality, risk assessment and fraud are also reviewed for each file. |
| Do they review the firm’s systems of quality management? | ASIC may also assess selected aspects of audit firm quality control systems over audits of financial reports. However this is not done routinely every year. | Yes. The inspection team will review the firm’s system of quality control, including areas such as the firm’s management structure and processes, practices for partner management, policies and procedures for an issuer’s acceptance and retention, internal inspections programs, how the firm responds to deficiencies in its audit quality, and independence policies and procedures. | Yes. They select components of the systems of quality management to identify examples of good practice. | Yes. They assess whether the audit firms’ systems of quality management are appropriate. | Yes. They evaluate the effectiveness of the system of quality management, including firm implementation of the new quality management standards, firm culture and firm leadership. |

Appendix 2 – How the Recommendations from the 2019 Disciplinary Review have been Addressed

| **ASIC** | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **ASIC’s detection, investigation, and enforcement processes** | | |
| **No.** | **Recommendations** | **Responses**48F[[49]](#footnote-49) |
| 1 | ASIC should adopt a more structured and consistent approach to preliminary investigations of RCA misconduct matters. | On 1 June 2018, ASIC introduced a new workflow system that better captures the existing approach to surveillance of potential RCA misconduct matters. This information is readily accessible to ASIC’s Enforcement teams prior to a formal memo seeking acceptance by Enforcement.  Following ASIC’s recent organisation design review a new Enforcement Inquiries and Compliance Team dedicated to Financial Reporting Audit and Corporations matters was established. The team has staff with relevant experience and considers auditor misconduct referrals from stakeholder teams for possible enforcement action. |
| 2 | ASIC should improve its record keeping and data management systems to ensure key decision points in relation to RCA matters are easily tracked across the organisation. | ASIC implemented a new workflow system which is used by all ASIC teams. The progress of a matter and key decision points can be more easily tracked across the organisation. |
| 3 | ASIC should evaluate whether the criteria used for resourcing a RCA misconduct matter for enforcement action appropriately recognises the market‐wide benefits of improving audit quality. | ASIC Information Sheet 151 *ASIC’s approach to enforcement* publicly was reissued in November 2021. It outlines ASICs general approach to enforcement and discusses how we respond to matters taking into account considerations such as:  Strategic significance (e.g., what is the extent of harm or loss?);  Benefits of pursuing misconduct (e.g., is enforcement cost‑effective?);  Issues specific to the case (e.g., what evidence is available?); and  What enforcement tools are available.  A new internal guide for assessing auditor related matters has been developed having regard to ASIC’s experience from current audit matters under investigation.  Note also that the objective under ASIC’s Enforcement Strategy since 2019 has been to identity, prioritise and act quickly and decisively on the most important enforcement matters within ASIC to obtain criminal and civil court‑based outcomes that discourage and punish misconduct. In order to further this priority, ASIC is pursuing several current investigations in relation to auditor misconduct, which include a focus on pursuing criminal and or civil liability for relevant auditor misconduct. |
| 4 | ASIC should outline how their ‘why not litigate’ enforcement strategy will apply to misconduct by RCAs. | [ASIC’s Corporate Plan 2023–27](https://download.asic.gov.au/media/2cshqbxb/asic-corporate-plan-2023-27-focus-2023-24-published-28-august-2023.pdf) has dropped all mention of ‘Why not litigate?’ test but is committed to continuing as an ‘active litigator against misconduct’. ASIC assesses the best regulatory approach to a matter having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances, as well as the full range of regulatory tools available to ASIC. This applies to misconduct by RCAs. |

| **ASIC** | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **ASIC’s Audit Inspection Program** | | |
| **No.** | **Recommendations** | **Responses**49F[[50]](#footnote-50) |
| 10 | Potential breaches of the law and failures of RCAs to meet their obligations identified in ASIC’s Audit Inspection Program should be reviewed for possible enforcement action. | ASIC reviews negative findings from audit file reviews conducted as a part of our audit firm inspections for possible enforcement action, as appropriate.  ASIC took criminal action against the lead auditor and audit company for the audit of Halifax Investment Services Pty Ltd, as well as referring the lead auditor to the CADB.  ASIC’s enforcement actions have also resulted in one auditor being convicted for failing to comply with the auditing standards and one auditor being charged with contravening the Corporations Act. In addition, 2 auditors’ registrations were suspended by the CADB for deficient audits. |
| 11 | ASIC should publish the results of audit inspections in greater detail, including naming firms. | This has been adopted. For example, in October 2022, ASIC published the percentage of negative findings from reviews of key audit areas in audit files as a part of its audit firm inspections during the 12 months to 30 June 2022. ASIC Report [743](https://download.asic.gov.au/media/up0fmjmy/rep743-published-28-october-2022.pdf) Audit inspection report for 2021–22 included individual percentages for each of the largest 6 firms by name.  Under ASIC’s new financial reporting and audit surveillance program they include in its public report individual audit findings for all firms reviewed in the period, providing prominence to all audit findings. Firms are no longer named. From 1 July 2022, ASIC report audit findings to the directors of companies as well as the auditor to encourage constructive dialogue between the company and auditor to improve financial reporting and audit quality. |
| 12 | ASIC be given the power to compel remediation of defective audits, alongside the power to publish notices when this occurs. | ASIC is supportive of this proposal however this requires legislative change. |
| 13 | ASIC should consider the division of resources between audit inspection and financial reporting surveillance work to ensure that ASIC’s resources are being used effectively to ensure good RCA audit quality. | Audit and financial reporting surveillances are all conducted by ASIC’s Companies and Small Business team. Resources continue to be dynamically allocated within the team to achieve the best outcomes for quality financial reporting supported by quality audits. |
| 14 | ASIC and the FRC will work together to implement the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services report Oversight of ASIC, the Takeovers Panel and the Corporations Legislation No.1 of the 45th Parliament recommendation to devise a study that would track audit quality over time. | In December 2019, ASIC published Report [649](https://download.asic.gov.au/media/5409270/rep649-published-12-december-2019.pdf) Audit quality measures, indicators and other information: 2018–19. This report was partly in response to the recommendation. The report contains a broad group of audit quality measures, indicators, and other information to supplement the findings outlined in ASIC Report [648](https://download.asic.gov.au/media/5409276/rep648-published-12-december-2019.pdf) Audit inspection report for 2018–19. In December 2020, ASIC published Report [678](https://download.asic.gov.au/media/5900581/rep678-published-22-december-2020.pdf) Audit quality measures, indicators and other information 2019–20, which similarly supplemented Report [677](https://download.asic.gov.au/media/5900575/rep677-published-22-december-2020.pdf) Audit inspection report: 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020.  The output measures that appeared in Reports [648](https://download.asic.gov.au/media/5409276/rep648-published-12-december-2019.pdf) and [678](https://download.asic.gov.au/media/5900581/rep678-published-22-december-2020.pdf) were included in Report 709 Audit inspection report: 1 July 2020 to 30 June 2021, together with input measures on audit fees and non‑audit fees. In 2022, ASIC separately reported on the effectiveness of root cause analysis at the largest 6 firms in Report [739](https://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/reports/rep-739-root-cause-analysis-audit-firm-thematic-review/).  The results of FRC/AUASB [surveys](https://auasb.gov.au/media/4ujeedno/auasb_researchreport9_12-22.pdf) of audit committee chairs and CFOs on perceptions of audit quality were published by the FRC/AUASB in December 2022.  The information required for other measures and indicators was provided by the 6 largest audit firms to ASIC and is no longer collected from the largest 6 firms. This is due to the time and effort required by the firms to collect this information and the view of the firms that the cost outweighed the benefit. |

| **The CADB** | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **No.** | **Recommendations** | **Responses**50F[[51]](#footnote-51) |
| 1 | CADB and ASIC should work to adopt a less formal and a more timely approach to the carriage of CADB matters. This should include a review of CADB’s practice and procedures manuals. | CADB has comprehensively revised its matter conduct guidelines for parties to applications (Matter Guidelines).  The Matter Guidelines introduce new hearing preparation procedures to be conducted between the parties which are designed to result in streamlined hearings and more efficient decision‑making on applications to meet the FRC’s 1st recommendation of adopting a less formal and more timely approach to matters once they are filed with CADB.  CADB consulted with ASIC on the proposed changes before they were finalised. The [Matter Guidelines](https://www.cadb.gov.au/resources/manuals-and-guidelines/) may be found on the CADB website.  The Matter Guidelines are designed to enable CADB to deliver decisions within a shorter timeframe and deal with more volume, to the extent applications are made. |
| 2 | The Government should consider revising provisions so that CADB may publish the commencement of proceedings including naming the RCA subject to the proceedings and his or her firm. | CADB believes that the transparency benefits need to be balanced against the potential reputational damage caused by such publication. If CADB selectively published the names of some RCAs to proceedings and not others, this might be perceived as lacking impartiality. |
| 3 | The Government should consider providing CADB with additional disciplinary powers, including powers to suspend registration during a CADB proceeding and impose fines against individual RCAs or the firms that employ them, if adverse findings are made. | CADB supports this recommendation in principle. |
| 4 | If a greater number of applications are made to CADB as a result of current and upcoming reforms, the Government should consider whether CADB will require additional administrative support to ensure matters are dealt with. | CADB supports this recommendation however additional resources will be necessary for the CADB to hear more applications. |

| The PABs | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **No.** | **Recommendations** | **Responses**51F[[52]](#footnote-52) |
| 1 | Professional bodies should refer to ASIC all matters relating to RCAs where there appears there may be a breach of the law. | **CPA**  Due to privacy regulations CPA Australia can only refer to ASIC evidence of breaches of law or matters that have been published and/or the Disciplinary Tribunal specifies that ASIC is to be notified. Where this is the case CPA Australia’s Professional Conduct Unit will notify ASIC in writing. |
| **CA ANZ**  Due to confidentiality requirements, this would need to be a specific sanction applied to the member, CA ANZ will amend the operating guidelines to facilitate this. |
| **IPA**  The IPA has not had cause to report to ASIC as we are not aware of any RCA members breaching the law. All breaches have been against professional and ethical standards and IPA by‑laws. If the situation should arise, we will refer the matter to ASIC. The IPA has on the other hand, had members refer breaches of the law to ASIC relating to a range of matters.  Members are obliged under Non‑compliance with Laws and Regulations to report potential and actual material breaches of laws and regulations to the relevant public authority, and this obligation is consistently reinforced with all IPA members. The IPA have assisted members in this regard on numerous occasions. |
| 2 | Professional bodies should accurately record all disciplinary processes, including those that lead to no substantive action, and the reasons for the decision. They should also distinguish between lack of evidence that conduct was inappropriate and lack of evidence because information was not provided. | **CPA**  All disciplinary processes are recorded accurately and electronically by the Professional Conduct Unit of CPA, including reasons for the decisions. Outcomes of Disciplinary Tribunal hearings are recorded, including the reasons for sustaining (or dismissing) complaints/allegations and the reasons for the penalty/ies imposed. For those matters that do not proceed to a Disciplinary Tribunal for hearing due to either insufficient evidence provided by the complainant or the evidence provided does not support the allegations made, reasons for the decision are recorded in the final report and communicated to the parties involved. |
| **CA ANZ**  CA ANZ records all disciplinary processes, and will however amend the recording to distinguish between lack of evidence that conduct was inappropriate and lack of evidence because information was not provided. |
| **IPA**  This is already being done. The IPA records all disciplinary action taken against members. The IPA ensures that the information recorded includes reasons for the decision including where there is lack of evidence that conduct was inappropriate, and lack of evidence because information was not provided. IPA members who face disciplinary action can be penalised for failing to provide information requested as part of the disciplinary process.    Since COVID‑19, IPA has introduced enhanced record keeping and reporting through the use of digital document management systems, electronic signatures, enhanced recording, improved online public and member communications, and our Disciplinary Tribunal hearings are entirely virtual. Further digitisation is currently underway which will lead to more improvements in the overall disciplinary process. In addition to a process of continuous improvement, the IPA commenced a root and branch review of its complaints and disciplinary system and processes to ensure they are operating at best practice levels. The final tranche will be completed in early 2024. |
| 3 | Professional bodies should formalise processes for advising each other and the FRC of their disciplinary proceedings, particularly regarding RCAs. | **CPA**  CPA Australia has continued to review how it may form closer ties with other statutory and professional bodies to directly advise them of disciplinary outcomes that are publicly available on CPA Australia’s website. In September 2020 CPA Australia and the FRC signed a [MOU](https://frc.gov.au/all-frc-documents/mou/mou-between-cpa-australia-and-frc) to collaborate wherever possible and mutually beneficial to ensure audit quality and to promote open discussion on issues relating to audit quality. |
| **CA ANZ**  Due to confidentiality requirements, this would need to be a specific sanction applied to the member, CA ANZ will amend the operating guidelines to facilitate this.  In addition in September 2020 CA ANZ and the FRC signed a [MOU](https://frc.gov.au/all-frc-documents/mou/mou-between-ca-anz-and-frc) to collaborate wherever possible and mutually beneficial to ensure audit quality and to promote open discussion on issues relating to audit quality. As part of this CA ANZ undertakes to inform the FRC of any disciplinary action taken against any member of CA ANZ in relation to a breach of CA ANZ’s audit quality requirements without necessarily identifying individual auditors. CA ANZ will also inform the FRC when it is aware that one of its members has been referred to the CADB in relation to a breach of audit quality requirements. |
| **IPA**  The outcomes of IPA’s disciplinary proceedings are published, and members are required to report any disciplinary action taken by other bodies or regulators etc and can be penalised for failing to do so. The IPA has not formalised processes with the other bodies, however subject to obtaining further legal advice, the IPA may be in a position to comply with or implement the recommendations. The IPA regularly engages with the other PABs and regulatory bodies to discuss developments, trends, and concerns. The IPA adheres to its legal obligations on privacy and confidentiality and will take these into consideration. In September 2020 the IPA and the FRC signed a [MOU](https://frc.gov.au/all-frc-documents/mou/mou-between-ipa-and-frc) to collaborate wherever possible to promote open discussion on issues relating to audit quality. |
| 4 | Professional bodies should publicly report statistics on the number of complaints they receive, and the number of complaints that do not proceed. | **CPA**  There has been no change in CPA’s complaints reporting processes since the update of March 2020. CPA Australia’s [Annual Integrated Report](https://www.cpaaustralia.com.au/-/media/project/cpa/corporate/documents/about-cpa/our-organisation/annual-report/cpa-australia-integrated-report-2021-full-report.pdf?rev=1a7a6e4cd3ff4a91bd07505770238b5c) contains statistics relating to the source of complaints received, those investigated and closed due to lack of supporting evidence and complaints brought before a disciplinary tribunal and penalties imposed. |
| **CAANZ**  CA ANZ currently publish the number of complaints and the outcome in their [annual report](https://charteredaccountants.partica.online/chartered-accountants/ca-anz-annual-report-2022/flipbook/1/). |
| **IPA**  The IPA publishes statistics on the number and nature of complaints received and outcomes. The IPA publishes information on the type of complaint, common causes of investigations, geographical location of members and information on the outcomes of Tribunal decisions, including reasons for determination provided by the Tribunal. With respect to the number of complaints that don’t proceed (i.e., ‘no case to answer’), the IPA provides this information internally for Board purposes and as part of our Professional Standards Improvement Program with the Professional Standards Councils. |

# Appendix 3 – Stakeholders Interviewed

We thank representatives from the following bodies who shared their views with us:

**Audit Firms**

Deloitte

EY

PwC

KPMG

BDO

Grant Thornton

Pitcher Partners

William Buck

**Regulators**

ASIC

APRA

Tax Practitioners Board

**Professional Accounting Bodies**

CA ANZ

CPA Australia CPA

IPA

**Other**

The Companies Auditor Disciplinary Board (CADB)

Accounting Professional & Ethical Standards Board (APESB)

Professional Standards Council

# Glossary

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| AASB | Australian Accounting Standards Board. |
| **ACC** | Audit Committee Chair. |
| **ACNC** | Australian Charities and Not‑for‑profits Commission. |
| **AFR** | Australian Financial Review. |
| **AICD** | Australian Institute of Company Directors. |
| **APESB** | Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards Board. |
| **APRA** | Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. |
| **ASA** | Australian Auditing Standards. |
| **ASIC** | Australian Securities and Investments Commission. |
| **ASX** | Australian Securities Exchange. |
| **ATO** | Australian Taxation Office. |
| **AUASB** | Auditing and Assurance Standards Board. |
| **CA ANZ** | Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand. |
| **CADB** | Companies and Auditors Disciplinary Board. |
| **CEO** | Chief Executive Officer. |
| **CPA** | CPA Australia. |
| **CPAB** | Canadian Public Accountability Board. |
| **CPD** | Continuing Professional Development. |
| **CPP** | Certificate of Public Practice. |
| **EY** | Ernst & Young Australia. |
| **FMA** | Financial Markets Authority. |
| **FRC** | Financial Reporting Council. |
| **GT** | Grant Thornton Australia Limited. |
| **IFAC** | International Federation of Accountants. |
| **IFIAR** | International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators. |
| **IOSCO** | International Organization of Securities Commissions. |
| **IPA** | Institute of Public Accountants. |
| **MOU** | Memorandum of Understanding. |
| **NZICA** | New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants. |
| **PABs** | Professional Accounting Bodies. This consists of CA ANZ, CPA and IPA. |
| **PAF** | Professional Accounting Firm in Canada. |
| **PCAOB** | Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. |
| **PCC** | Professional Conduct Committee. |
| **PCFR** | Professional Conduct Framework Review. |
| **PCOC** | Professional Conduct Oversight Committee. |
| **PIE** | Public Interest Entity. |
| **PJC** | Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services. |
| **PSC** | Professional Standards Council. |
| **PSP** | Professional Service Provider in Canada. |
| **PWC** | PricewaterhouseCoopers Australia. |
| **SMO** | Statements of Membership Obligations. |
| **SMSF** | Self‑Managed Superannuation Fund. |
| **QMS** | Quality Management Standards. |
| **RCA** | Registered Company Auditor. |
| **UK FRC** | UK Financial Reporting Council |

# Resources Reviewed

1. Relevant parts of Corporations Act 2001
2. s 225(2C) Australian and Investments Commission Act 2001
3. Submissions to the [PJC Inquiry](https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Corporations_and_Financial_Services/ConsultancyFirms#:~:text=On%2022%20June%202023%2C%20the,the%20%27Big%20Four%27).): Ethics and Accountability: Structural Challenges in the Audit, Assurance and Consultancy Industry
4. Submissions to the [Senate Inquiry](https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Finance_and_Public_Administration/Consultingservices) into Management and Assurance of Integrity by Consulting Services and the [NSW Government’s](https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/committees/inquiries/Pages/inquiry-details.aspx?pk=2963#tab-submissions) use and management of consulting services
5. Auditor registration [requirements](https://asic.gov.au/for-finance-professionals/company-auditors/applying-for-auditor-or-authorised-audit-company-registration/)
6. [IOSCO](https://www.iosco.org/) Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation
7. [IOSCO](https://www.iosco.org/) Principles for Auditor Oversight
8. IFIAR’s Core Principles for Independent Audit Regulators
9. CAANZ, CPA, IPA Annual Reports
10. Relevant extracts from PAB’s by‑laws
11. The PAB’s requirements for membership entry, CPP and CPD
12. Extracts from the PAB’s quality review programs
13. Reporting on PAB quality review programs and results
14. CAANZ Professional Conduct Framework Review [Final Report](https://www.charteredaccountantsanz.com/news-and-analysis/media-centre/press-releases/ca-anz-professional-conduct-framework-review)
15. [CA ANZs](https://www.charteredaccountantsanz.com/news-and-analysis/advocacy/policy-submissions/joint-accounting-bodies-seek-coordinated-national-reporting-reform) Summary of Research into Statutory audit and assurance requirements and the demand for RCAs in Australia
16. ASIC [Report 743](https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/find-a-media-release/2022-releases/22-296mr-asic-reports-on-audit-inspection-findings-for-12-months-to-30-june-2022/) ASIC reports on audit inspection findings for 12 months to 30 June 2022
17. ASIC [Report 774](https://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/reports/rep-774-annual-financial-reporting-and-audit-surveillance-report-2022-23/) Annual financial reporting and audit surveillance report 2022–23
18. ASIC’s [RG 260](https://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/regulatory-guides/rg-260-communicating-findings-from-audit-files-to-directors-audit-committees-or-senior-managers/) Communicating findings from audit files to directors, audit committees or senior management
19. ASIC [Information Sheet 196](https://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/financial-reporting-and-audit/auditors/audit-quality-the-role-of-others/) Audit Quality: The role of directors and audit committees
20. ASIC [Information Sheet 184](https://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/financial-reporting-and-audit/auditors/audit-transparency-reports/) Audit transparency reports
21. ASIC [Information Sheet 224](https://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/financial-reporting-and-audit/auditors/asic-audit-surveillances/) Audit surveillances
22. ASIC [Information Sheet 151](https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/asic-investigations-and-enforcement/asic-s-approach-to-enforcement/) ASIC’s Approach to Enforcement
23. ASIC’s [Corporate Plan](https://www.google.com/search?q=asic+corporate+plan+2023-27&oq=&gs_lcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUqBggDEEUYOzIGCAAQRRg5MggIARAAGBYYHjIICAIQABgWGB4yBggDEEUYOzIICAQQABgWGB4yCAgFEAAYFhgeMgoIBhAAGA8YFhgeMggIBxAAGBYYHjIKCAgQABiGAxiKBdIBCDg0NDJqMGoxqAIAsAIA&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8) 2023–27
24. [ASQM 1](https://standards.auasb.gov.au/australian-auditing-standards?series_id=2) *Quality Control for Firms that Perform Audits and Reviews of Financial Reports and Other Financial Information, Other Assurance Engagements and Related Services Engagements*
25. [ASA 102](https://standards.auasb.gov.au/) *Compliance with Ethical Requirements when Performing Audits, Reviews and Other Assurance Engagements*
26. APESB’s [Website](https://apesb.org.au/about-apesb/governance/board-of-directors/) and Annual Report
27. CADB [Website](https://www.cadb.gov.au/) and Annual Report
28. Transparency Reports of the largest 6 audit firms
29. IFAC’s [SMO 1](https://www.ifac.org/_flysystem/azure-private/publications/files/Statements-of-Membership-Obligations-1-7-Revised.pdf)
30. Professional Standards Council [website](https://www.ifac.org/_flysystem/azure-private/publications/files/Statements-of-Membership-Obligations-1-7-Revised.pdf)
31. Public reporting by the PCAOB, UK FRC, NZ FMA and CPAB on their Audit Surveillance Programs

1. Refer to the Glossary for a list of the abbreviations and acronyms used in this report. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Refer s 225(2C) Australian and Investments Commission Act 2001 (the ASIC Act). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. S.225(2C)(a)(iii) of the ASIC Act. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. The 6 largest audit firms plus a sample of mid and smaller firms. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. For example the [PJC Inquiry](https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Corporations_and_Financial_Services/ConsultancyFirms#:~:text=On%2022%20June%202023%2C%20the,the%20%27Big%20Four%27).): Ethics and Accountability: Structural Challenges in the Audit, Assurance and Consultancy Industry, [Senate Inquiry](https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Finance_and_Public_Administration/Consultingservices) into Management and Assurance of Integrity by Consulting Services and the [NSW Government’s](https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/committees/inquiries/Pages/inquiry-details.aspx?pk=2963#tab-submissions) use and management of consulting services. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Refer to [Rep 743](https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/find-a-media-release/2022-releases/22-296mr-asic-reports-on-audit-inspection-findings-for-12-months-to-30-june-2022/) ASIC reports on audit inspection findings for 12 months to 30 June 2022 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Refer to [Rep 774](https://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/reports/rep-774-annual-financial-reporting-and-audit-surveillance-report-2022-23/) Annual financial reporting and audit surveillance report 2022–23 [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Refer to Appendix 1 for a comparison of the scope and size of some overseas jurisdictions audit inspection programs. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Corporations Act s 307A requires auditors to conduct audits of financial reports prepared under Part 2M.3 in accordance with Australian Auditing Standards. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Refer to the APESB’s [Website](https://apesb.org.au/about-apesb/governance/board-of-directors/) for an overview of the Board of Directors. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. ASIC have indicated they will review aspects of the QMS in 2024/25. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. We acknowledge that data on the high level findings is provided to the FRC and reported in our Annual Reports. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. These are subject to some form of statutory supervision. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. The number of RCAs was 3077 at 30 June 2023 and 6163 at 30 June 2005. These numbers were provided by ASIC. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Refer [Submission 4](https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Corporations_and_Financial_Services/ConsultancyFirms/Submissions) to the PJC Ethics and Accountability: Structural Challenges in the Audit, Assurance and Consultancy Industry. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Pt 2M.3, Division 3 and Part 2M.4 [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. [ASA 102](https://standards.auasb.gov.au/) Compliance with Ethical Requirements when Performing Audits, Reviews and Other Assurance Engagements. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Each PAB has a by‑laws requiring members who provide services to the public to have a CPP. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. [Australia Regulations & Guidance for Members | CA ANZ (charteredaccountantsanz.com)](https://www.charteredaccountantsanz.com/member-services/member-obligations/regulations-and-guidance/australian-regulations), [Now you’re a CPA: what’s next? | CPA Australia](https://www.cpaaustralia.com.au/your-cpa-program/now-youre-a-cpa#:~:text=As%20a%20member%20of%20CPA,a%20result%20of%20your%20study.), [CPD Records Feature (publicaccountants.org.au)](https://www.publicaccountants.org.au/events/cpd-records-feature#:~:text=IPA%20Members%20are%20required%20to,over%20a%20three%2Dyear%20period.) [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. [CA ANZ](https://www.charteredaccountantsanz.com/learning-and-events/managing-your-cpd/cpd-requirements/important-changes-to-your-cpd-requirements) requires members to undertake a minimum of 2 hours of verifiable ethics training per triennium. IPA have also introduced 3 new competency areas of CPD with one being Professional and Ethical Standards [Pronouncement‑7‑V41‑CPD‑6‑Sep‑2022.pdf (publicaccountants.org.au)](https://www.publicaccountants.org.au/media/4140524/Pronouncement-7-V41-CPD-6-Sep-2022.pdf), and CPA [Ethics requirements for CPD | CPA Australia](https://www.cpaaustralia.com.au/career-development/continuing-professional-development/ethics-requirements-for-cpd) which is minimum 2 hours a year, and 10 hours over 3 years. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Under the ACNC Act, Medium and Large charities must have their audit conducted by an RCA, an audit firm or an authorised audit company. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. [Co‑operatives (Adoption of National Law) Act 2012 No 29](http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/num_act/conla2012n29400.pdf) [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. As discussed in [CA ANZs](https://www.charteredaccountantsanz.com/news-and-analysis/advocacy/policy-submissions/joint-accounting-bodies-seek-coordinated-national-reporting-reform) Summary of Research into Statutory audit and assurance requirements and the demand for RCAs in Australia some state and federal legislation refers to an appropriate person, some fit & proper person, a specified auditor [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. The QMS apply to audit, assurance and related services provided by audit firms. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. QMS replace the previous Auditing Standard Quality Control for Firms that Perform Audits which have been in place since 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. ASQM 1 paragraph A30. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Section 332 of the Corporations Act. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Refer to the individual firms’ websites for a copy of their Transparency Reports. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Refer AFR Article [PwC tax scandal has exposed partnerships as regulatory havens (afr.com)](https://www.afr.com/companies/professional-services/pwc-tax-leak-scandal-has-exposed-partnerships-as-regulatory-havens-20231004-p5e9u1?utm_content=INTRODUCTION&list_name=E508F719-E064-4C7E-891D-38A5B4F0E40D&promote_channel=edmail&utm_campaign=afr-professional-life&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&utm_term=2023-10-11&mbnr=MTMxOTg5MDg&instance=2023-10-11-06-00-AEDT&jobid=29925203). [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Auditor Regulation Act. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Refer to Appendix 1 for a comparison of ASIC’s program with the PCAOB, UK FRC, New Zealand’s FMA and CPAB. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Refer ASIC [Information Sheet 224](https://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/financial-reporting-and-audit/auditors/asic-audit-surveillances/) which outlines ASIC’s approach to audit surveillance. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. As reported in ASIC’s Annual reporting and audit surveillance report 2022–23. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Refer [RG 260 Communicating findings from audit files to directors, audit committees or senior managers](https://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/find-a-document/regulatory-guides/rg-260-communicating-findings-from-audit-files-to-directors-audit-committees-or-senior-managers/). [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. [ASQM 1](https://www.auasb.gov.au/media/40ijwc0u/asqm1_03-21_1620870747504.pdf) also requires firms to include information from external inspections when determining if there are deficiencies in their systems of quality management. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. IFIAR is a membership organisation of 54 independent audit regulators including ASIC. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Refer [ASIC Annual financial reporting and audit surveillance report 2022–23](https://download.asic.gov.au/media/vghfoz4o/rep774-published-18-october-2023.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. These matters relate to failure to lodge annual returns. Refer to [CADB decisions | CADB – Companies Auditors Disciplinary Board](https://www.cadb.gov.au/decisions/cadb-decisions/) [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. These matters relate to failure to lodge annual reports and were withdrawn when the auditor lodged required documentation or cancelled their registration [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Recommendation 4.1, ASX Corporate Governance Council, Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (4th ed.). [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Refer to [Audit Quality in Australia: The Perspective of Audit Committee Chairs 2018](https://www.auasb.gov.au/admin/file/content102/c3/AQSurveyReport-FINAL-Printable.pdf), [Audit Quality in Australia: The Perspective of Audit Committee Chairs 2021](https://www.auasb.gov.au/admin/file/content102/c3/AQSurveyReport2020_2-21.pdf), and [Perceptions of Audit Quality by Audit Committee Chairs in Australia 2022](https://auasb.gov.au/media/4ujeedno/auasb_researchreport9_12-22.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. NZICA amalgamated with the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia (ICAA) on 1 January 2015, to form the Chartered Accountants Australia and New Zealand. However, for the purposes of New Zealand’s audit oversight regime, NZICA continues to be the accredited body. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Auditor Regulation Act 2011. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Provided by ASIC. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Refer [Report REP 743 Audit inspection report: 1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022 (asic.gov.au)](https://download.asic.gov.au/media/up0fmjmy/rep743-published-28-october-2022.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Refer [staff‑preview‑2022‑inspection‑observations‑spotlight.pdf (pcaobus.org)](https://assets.pcaobus.org/pcaob-dev/docs/default-source/documents/staff-preview-2022-inspection-observations-spotlight.pdf?sfvrsn=63b51390_2). [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Refer [2022‑Audit‑Quality‑Monitoring‑Report.pdf (fma.govt.nz)](https://www.fma.govt.nz/assets/Reports/2022-Audit-Quality-Monitoring-Report.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Refer [cpab‑ccrc.ca/docs/default‑source/inspections‑reports/2022‑annual‑inspections‑results‑en.pdf](https://cpab-ccrc.ca/docs/default-source/inspections-reports/2022-annual-inspections-results-en.pdf). [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. These responses are based on communications to the FRC in December 2021. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. These responses are based on communications to the FRC. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. These responses are based on communications to the FRC. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. These responses are based on communications to the FRC. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)